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Executive summary  
 
 
Online platforms are intermediaries in the digital economy that enable the exchange of goods, 
services or information between two or more parties1. They facilitate matching and make trade 
more efficient2. The mechanisms and strategies by which these digital intermediaries provide 
these efficiencies universally revolve around the use of technology that intensively and 
extensively builds on data. The way data is generated and shared becomes a critical issue in a 
context where online services are increasingly diversified. Such data is the subject of this 
report.  Data generated through or in relation to online platforms fosters innovation. Data plays 
an increasingly important role in business intelligence, product development, and process 
optimization. 
                                                 
 
* Some sections of the report draw significantly on the following:  
PPMI (2020) Analytical Paper 1: Platform data access and secondary data sources, Support study to the 
Observatory for the Online Platform Economy, available at 
https://platformobservatory.eu/app/uploads/2020/09/Analytical-paper-1-Platform-data-access-and-secondary-
data-sources_final.pdf  
PPMI (2020) Analytical Paper 5: Business user and third-party access to online platform data, Support study to 




1 A conceptualization of platforms for legal and regulatory purposes in Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Teresa. 
“The Legal Anatomy of Electronic Platforms: A Prior Study to Assess the Need of a Law of Platforms in the 
EU”, 3 The Italian Law Journal, num. 1/3, 2017: 149-176, at 157.  
2 See, for instance Goldfarb, Avi, and Catherine Tucker. "Digital Economics", Journal of Economic Literature, 
2019, 57 (1): 3-43. 
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Data has become a new currency at times where many online services are provided for “free”, 
fuelled by the data provided by their users. Data is also the basis for competition and further 
innovation. While a number of national, EU and international reports clearly recognise the 
importance of data for the online platform economy, they rarely highlight the complexity and 
heterogeneity of data in the platform environment.  
This report provides a structured overview of how data is generated, collected and used in the 
online platform economy. It maps out the diversity and heterogeneity of data-related practices 
and expands on what different types of data require a careful examination in order to better 
understand their importance for both the platforms and their users as well as the issues and 
challenges arising in their interactions.   
 
The report is organized as follows: 
Firstly, it gives an overview of the concept of data, describes how it is generated and suggests 
possible classifications.                                 
                                                                                                         
Secondly, it illustrates the diversity of data sharing practices, which corresponds to the variety 
of business models in the platform economy. An overview of different data categories maps 
platforms’ data practices, notably as regards their data collection and the access they allow to 
the data they hold as well as limits to such data access. The report examines different 
approaches to data usage, access and data sharing. The report looks into various incentives and 
models for data sharing, assessing whether there is room to promote it beyond a mere remedy 
for market inefficiencies. It shows, on the other hand, that there may be legitimate reasons to 
restrict access to data, e.g. to protect trade secrets or a specific business model or even to 
prevent collusion. The innovative capacities of platforms rely, in particular, on the richness of 
the data they collect, which allows them to gain deep insights on how the markets function, 
prospects and trends. In order to generate value across markets and stimulate innovation, 
however, different actors have an interest in getting access to data and opportunities to re-use 
it.  
Thirdly, it investigates a number of policy issues. It takes into account the value of data for 
platforms and businesses linked to its generation and processing on the one hand and to 
businesses’ ability to access, analyse and use data on the other hand to improve their services. 
The issues arise in relation to how far the access to and processing, on an exclusivity basis, of 
significant data sets by certain online platforms could distort the platform economy by giving 
rise to entry barriers, market power or preferential treatment of platforms’ own goods and 
services. Emerging answers to these issues are not necessarily consensual, owing to the 
diversity of data and of the services as such in the online platform economy.  
The report concludes with a range of issues, which deserve, in the view of the authors, further 
policy attention and analysis. More research is required notably to address the lack of empirical 
evidence, in particular on data sharing practices and user needs. We would need more clarity 
on certain technical issues that might prevent of discourage data sharing. Finally, we would 
need to identify options for incentives as well as reasons for restraining the access to and 
sharing of data. Notably, the report calls for the work on data to be continued by the 






By using digital technology, platforms have appeared as a new and improved mechanism to 
address the fundamental problem of economic organisation: how to coordinate supply and 
demand when information is imperfect to reach the highest possible efficiency. In the context 
of sophisticated economies with increasingly varied types of goods and services on offer, and 
a wider dispersion of preferences from the consumption side, finding valuable interactions 
becomes a complex task. Platforms have proposed a solution based on (matching) algorithms 
and data. In order to provide accurate matches, algorithms require large amounts of data, 
making data collection and access a key feature of the platform economy.  
A number of national, EU and international reports highlight the relevance of data for the online 
platform economy as well as for innovative, data-driven technologies such as AI. Yet, we have 
observed that these reports, somehow, tend to take too limited views of the meaning of the term 
“data”, or not go deep enough in describing it, disregarding the numerous facets that data can 
have, depending on how and by whom it is generated and used.  
To attempt to enrich the understanding of data in the platform economy, the Expert Group to 
the Observatory for the online platform economy has taken an academic and independent look 
at the variety and complexity of data and its significance for all different actors in the online 
platform economy. The purpose of this report is also to bring focus in the discussions on data 
by providing a structured overview of data-related practices in the online platform 
economy. Specifically, we aim to summarise the present understanding of the importance of 
data for platforms’ business models, challenges associated with the socio-economic 
interactions that platforms intermediate and discuss the issue of access to data and data sharing. 
This report should be viewed as part of ongoing research of the Observatory on Data in the 
online platform ecosystem.  
The report comes timely at a moment where a number of government and private initiatives at 
national, EU and international level look into issues linked to data, calling for different 
approaches to regulate its collection, use, access and sharing, raising questions of efficiency 
and competition, but also fairness, privacy and ownership. Against this background, the 
European Commission has just presented its data strategy for the next five years3. At the same 
time, it is launching a broad stakeholder consultation on the specific measures needed to ensure 
a leadership position for the EU in a data-driven economy, while respecting and promoting the 
European values. Besides, as part of the European Digital Strategy, the proposal of the 
European Commission of a new Digital Services Act package is aimed to address the profound 
change of the digital services market in a platform economy. The expansion and relevance of 
online platforms in the provision and intermediation of digital services have severely 
challenged the legal framework for digital services, unchanged since its adoption in 2000.  
The recently adopted Digital Services Act (DSA) will upgrade the ecommerce framework for 
all internet services in the EU to ensure that digital services face no borders inside the Union, 





while defining clearer responsibilities and accountability for online platforms such as social 
media and marketplaces for preventing illegal content and goods online.  
The other legislative proposal recently put forward by the European Commission, the Digital 
Markets Act (DMA), will ensure that markets characterised by large platforms acting as 
“gatekeepers” for businesses to reach consumers, remain fair and contestable for innovators, 
businesses, and new market entrants. It will establish rules to ban a number of unfair and 
anticompetitive practices used by such gatekeeper platforms exploiting their unprecedented 
economic power to the detriment of (smaller) businesses and consumers.  
These recent policy initiatives in the EU are aiming to touch upon some data-related aspects, 
but they will not exhaustively address all issues in the data economy. A step-by-step approach 
is required in this regard, given the multiple implications, some of which unforeseen or 
undesirable, that measures in this area can have. To ensure the soundness of such an approach, 
one of the indispensable steps is to recognize the complexity of the matter, and attempt to 
understand it to the greatest possible extent. 
For that reason, the analysis in this report aims to move away from general – and, implicitly, 
imprecise – statements on the need to use, access, and share data – either as a voluntary 
initiative or potentially as binding commitments. It seeks in particular to provide nuance to the 
debate by elaborating on the types of data held by platforms and generated through their 
intermediation activities and identify the different interests at stake. The report provides a 
survey of data sharing practices and models and a discussion on alternative data sources and 
the value of data in the online platform economy. The survey reveals that the variety of data by 
platforms and the constellation of data practices implemented by platforms require different 
data governance solutions and a more granular policy approach to balance interests at stake 
and achieve policy goals.   
A multi-sided platform engages in a balancing act to internalize externalities across different 
sides. This also guides its policy to share data and data analytics with its business users. Does 
a platform have a socially optimal incentive to share data, in particular when data is an 
indispensable input for innovation activities of business users? How does the vertical 
integration of a platform affect its incentive to share data? Which categories of data are 
primarily collected, observed, and inferred by platforms? Does the value of data depend on 
sectors? Which data have higher value in the platform economy? Which incentives should 
platform have to collect and process data if they have to share it with competitors or third 
parties? The answers to those questions are important to guide policy makers.  
Data sharing can be internal or external4. Data can be shared within the platform, between 
business users and the platform operator, which collects, observe and infers data from users’ 
activity. Platforms can also share data with third parties, either competitors or data seekers, or 
even government authorities. Incentives for the platform to share data internally or externally 
differ, as well as the legal, market, and policy consequences. Data sharing can be also voluntary 
trade in data (remunerated), voluntary exchange without remuneration, or mandatory sharing.  
Sharing can be direct (a transfer of data between two parties, or indirect (trading or sharing a 
                                                 
 
4 JRC (2020), Digital Economy Working Paper 2020-5, B2B Data sharing: An economic and legal analysis. 
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data-based service, insights derived from data but not the underlying primary data). Policy 
makers have to take these different angles of data sharing into consideration in devising data 
governance solutions.  
There can be three main reasons for which a platform does not share certain data with its 
business users. First, it may have a legitimate reason to protect its own business. For instance, 
some platforms, notably in the accommodation sector, usually do not share contact information 
of consumers with their business users, such as hotels, to prevent the latter from conducting 
transactions outside of the platform environment. Second, a complementor of a platform might 
grow to become a competitor of that platform. For instance, in the U.S. Microsoft case, 
Netscape, a complementor of Microsoft Windows, was expected to become a competitor of 
Windows. Last, vertical integration can induce a platform to restrict a rival app’s access to data. 
For instance, Google seems to maintain exclusive access to Android APIs for some innovative 
functionalities (ARCEP, 2018).  
In addition, there is currently a wider debate ongoing on e.g. platform-to-government data 
sharing5, on whether platforms should grant other actors – such as government authorities or 
potentially competing platforms – access to the data they hold, and whether businesses in 
general should share more data with each other.  
This report focuses primarily on business users’ and other third-party access to data held or 
processed by platforms. Other angles of data usage and sharing are treated in recent and 
ongoing work: for instance, the 2019 Report by Special Advisors to the Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager 6 provides an overview of data sharing practices from a 
competition policy perspective. That report stresses that the area is one of emerging research, 
in particular in relation to the notion of so-called “data pools”, i.e. large scale coherent – but 
potentially unstructured – data assets held by private companies.  
 
2. Data: conceptualisation and classification 
 
While many general statements are made about the importance of data in the platforms’ 
economy, there is generally very little precision on what “data” is, or which type of definition 
is used. Confusion often arises between volumes of data stored in data centres or transported 
through the physical network, or data as user-generated content disseminated through the 
platform, or data as meta-information about users’ interactions and transactions, for instance. 
Consequently, technical, economic and legal definitions of data need further context and 
                                                 
 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/meetings-expert-group-business-government-data-sharing 
6 Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Heike Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the Digital 
Era, Publications office of the European Union. 
 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/digitisation_2018/report_en.html  
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precision. From this perspective, data (an often-numerical resource, a building block or 
preliminary stage of information) can be considered as distinct from information and 
knowledge.7  
 
Different conceptualisations of data 
A well-established philosophical interpretation focuses on the “difference” that data express. 
Following this definition, “a datum is a putative fact regarding some difference or lack of 
uniformity within some context”8. The adjective “putative” is crucial here; it suggests that data 
are symbolic representations of the world that are neither objective nor free-standing givens. 
Instead, data have to be generated and made sense of and therefore reflect the context of their 
production. As the computer scientist Geoffrey C Bowker expressed, “data are always already 
'cooked' and never entirely 'raw”9. This implies that the value of data can change over time and 
may be bound to specific contexts10 . 
Another approach focuses on the properties or affordance of data, understood as lending 
themselves to specific forms of analysis11. They acquire their value as relational entries of data 
sets, which, in turn, may become components of other, larger data sets. Although not all data 
is valuable, their main characteristic is that they can be “used, reused, copied, moved, and 
processed cheaply, without degradation, at very fast speeds, and globally”.12. Due to 
digitalisation, the production mode of data is changing. To an increasing degree, data are today 
automatically generated by machines, programmes or sensors, not by human beings13. Even 
when data sets represent human beings or social actions, these may be involved only passively 
as a source rather than the producer of data14. 
From an economic perspective, the key characteristic of data is non-rivalry: data can be used 
or copied without diminishing or exhausting them. “A single piece of data can be used in 
multiple algorithms and applications at the same time”, which can make it difficult ‘to establish 
the rights to use, exclude and transfer data’15. Digitalisation reinforces the non-rivalrous nature 
of data, with decreasing costs for copying, reusing and merging digital data sets16. As non-
                                                 
 
7 See e.g. for a technical perspective, the DIKW pyramid exposed in Rowley, Jennifer (2007). "The wisdom 
hierarchy: representations of the DIKW hierarchy". Journal of Information and Communication Science. 33 (2): 
163–180.; or Zins, Chaim (22 January 2007). "Conceptual Approaches for Defining Data, Information, and 
Knowledge" (PDF). Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 58 (4): 479–493. 
8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
9 Cited after Gitelman 2013: 3 
10 For criteria regarding "data quality", see OECD (2015: 194) 
11 Gitelman (2013: 8) 
12 OECD (2019) Data in the Digital Age  
13 Duch-Brown et al (2017: 13) 
14 EPSC (2017: 5) 
15 HM Treasury 2018: The economic value of data: discussion paper 
16 Nestor Duch-Brown & Bertin Martens & Frank Mueller-Langer. "The economics of ownership, access and 
trade in digital data," JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy (2017-01), Joint Research Centre (Seville site).  
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rivalry implies that the same data can be used by a multitude of actors for a variety of purposes 
without causing functional loss to the original data collector or subsequent data user, significant 
potential gains can be attributed to data-sharing and data-re-use policies. This implies that 
social welfare will be maximised when access to the non-rival good is also maximised, as each 
extra private benefit comes at no extra cost17. The same feature of non-rivalry, in connection 
with the economies of scope, does also reveal another source of economic efficiency gains and 
social welfare: data aggregation. Merging two complementary datasets can generate more 
insights and economic value compared to keeping them separate. 
Different from physical goods, data are not excludable by nature: they can be copied and 
disseminated. Although the law can assign exclusive rights to data originators and/or collectors, 
they tend to use different strategies to guarantee an exclusive control and access to the data. 
The non-rivalry together with the excludability or non-excludability of data18 are characteristics 
that data governance models must consider and internalize. A need of balance or trade-off 
between the social welfare of wider data access and the benefits and efficiency of data 
concentration should guide policy decisions.    
The legal approach to data or data-related practices focuses on rights relating to use, curation, 
control, stewardship or exclusive access. Despite the lively debate and the existence of certain 
ownership-like rights in sectoral legislations on intangible assets, the legal approach does not 
pivot on an explicit recognition of data ownership rights.  
Specific properties of data affect the legal framework of "data governance"19. For the law to 
regulate data, it has to specify what it intends to protect20. For instance, the distinction between 
data syntax and semantics or that between machine- and human-produced data may be relevant 
for the appropriate legal framework. Other important properties concern the increasingly 
complex origins of -and contributions to- the production of data. Various "data stakeholders" 
are involved in the co-production of value and may therefore want to participate in the 
benefits21. However, traditional understandings of ownership "do not line up exactly" with the 
collaborative nature of data production in the platform economy and the de facto control over 
specific data sets22. More relevant than ownership titles to data might therefore be the control 
over "the means of analysis": While the 2015 OECD report still quotes A. Croll as saying that 
“The digital divide isn’t about who owns data – it’s about who can put that data to work” 23, 
the debate has evolved in the meantime.  
                                                 
 
17 OECD (2015: 179-180) 
18 Being non-rival, data can be either non-excludable (and then a public good) or excludable (hence a club good). 
19 See OECD (2015: 186) 
20 Drexl (2017: 263) 
21 OECD (2015: 195) 
22 OECD 2015: 195-7, with regard to patient data in the health sector; see also Drexl (2017: 260) 
23 Croll A. (2011) quoted in OECD (2015: 197) 
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To conclude, the singular properties of data and the purpose the data will be used for allow for 
a variety of data governance models, which differ according to the distribution of control and 
access and their overall social welfare effects.24 
 
Classification of data categories in platforms 
The wide variety of data-related practices in the platform economy reflects the great diversity 
of data, the variation in the value of data in different sectors, and the heterogeneity of data 
collection, data usage, and data processing policies. Any policy approach to regulate data 
access or data sharing needs to consider this variety and heterogeneity of data and data-related 
practices, while should pursue specific purposes25. Therefore, the analysis of data-related 
practices in the platform economy requires some prior classification of data categories, as well 
as to the legal implications of the respective categories. 
A number of typologies of data are possible and several taxonomies have already been 
produced in different contexts. The aim of this report is not to contribute another classification 
of data, but to rely on existing typologies and assume an operational categorization of data for 
the purposes of the report and further evidence collection and inquiry. Thus, different 
taxonomies might be used side-by-side depending on the policy question that is being 
addressed. 
A first categorisation, from a legal perspective, distinguishes between personal and non-
personal data. Enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 
11), the protection of personal data is further specified in the General Data Protection 
Regulation26, which defines personal data (Article 4(1) of that Regulation) as “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”, e.g. name or address. In contrast, non-
personal data does not pertain to an identified or identifiable individual, e.g. engine 
performance data or stock prices. The borderline between the two categories is becoming 
increasingly blurred, in particular in an IoT context27 while re-identification technologies are 
becoming more and more sophisticated28. Mixed data sets, including both personal and non-
personal data bring additional complexities; the European Commission issued a set of 
                                                 
 
24 OECD (2015) Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, (195-7) 
25 As stated in the better regulation guidelines of the EC, for instance. 
26 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation); OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1 
27 For example, data generated by a smart thermostat about patterns of energy usage could be considered non-
personal data. If, however, the data reveals behavioural patterns of identified or identifiable natural persons, the 
data could be categorized as personal data. 
28 See e.g. Rocher et al.” Estimating the success of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative 
models” Nature Communications 10 (2019) (showing that “the likelihood of a specific individual to have been 




guidelines aiming at adding further clarity as to the legal requirements concerning such data 
sets29. Ongoing research in areas such as differential privacy aim at reconciling data sharing 
and privacy concerns30 while industry take-up needs to gain speed. Ultimately, it is clear that 
it is not enough to look at the data to understand the privacy and data protection risks that its 
processing generates: assessing the data environment is in fact the key to data governance best 
practice and to ensure effectiveness of processes, such as pseudonymisation and 
anonymisation.31 This consideration creates tensions with the traditional static approach to the 
scope of the data protection framework32.  
From a privacy perspective, another important perspective comes from Article 7 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, guaranteeing privacy of communications. To 
the extent that platforms offer inter-personal communication services, or perform actions 
related to user terminal data, special provisions govern the use of such data sets. 
A classification commonly used for personal data describes three categories according to its 
provenance: volunteered data, observed data and inferred data33 34. “Volunteered data”35 is 
information that users actively share with the platform, e.g. when creating an account at an 
online marketplace or entering credit card details for online purchases. “Observed data” refers 
to activities of individuals, e.g. browsing history, location data from mobile devices, clicks on 
products. Finally, “inferred data” is information that a platform actively creates by aggregating, 
processing and analysing volunteered or observed data (by use of data analytics such as 
clustering, filtering or prediction), e.g. customer risk profiles or analysed user sentiment. 
Despite the utility of this classification, it must be acknowledged that in certain cases the 
distinction among the different categories of data – volunteered, observed, and inferred – blurs 
(e.g. product review scores). Such added complexity in the application of the taxonomy should 
be taken into consideration in the analysis of data-related practices.   
                                                 
 
29 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/practical-guidance-businesses-how-process-mixed-datasets     
30See e.g. C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy”, Foundations and Trends 
in Theoretical Computer Science Vol. 9, Nos. 3–4 (2014) 211–407, DOI: 10.1561/0400000042;  Duchi, 
John; Jordan, Michael; Wainwright, Martin. (2013). “Local Privacy and Statistical Minimax”, in 54th Annual 
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.  
31 Hence the importance of operating within a controlled environment.  
32 See e.g. Stalla-Bourdillon, S., & Knight, A., Anonymous data v. personal data - a false debate: an EU perspective 
on anonymization, pseudonymization and personal data. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2016, 34(2): 284-
322. Some authors have thus argued that the distinction between personal data and non personal data should be 
abandoned. See e.g. Purtova, N. (2018). The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU 
data protection law. Law, Innovation and Technology, 10(1), 40-81.  
33 World Economic Forum, Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens for Strengthening Trust, May 2014; see also 
Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the digital era, p. 24 et seq. 
34 Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework, CERRE report September 
2020, p 16-17, available at https://cerre.eu/publications/data-sharing-digital-markets-competition-governance/   
35 The term “volunteered” is to be used with caution. In order to use a platform, users typically have no choice 
than to share their data. Data thus becomes an “involuntary currency”. 
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The collection of each category of data entails different costs for the platform, with notable 
economies of scale. Whereas the collection of volunteered data is mainly based on the provision 
by the data users, observed data and inferred data imply collecting and processing costs. 
Consequently, data sharing and re-use costs as well as incentives for data sharing differ 
depending upon the category of data at stake. From a purely supply-side cost perspective, the 
higher the costs and the value of data for the platforms are, the lower the incentives to share 
data would be. Nevertheless, taking into account the demand side value, platforms would have 
incentives to share high-value data precisely due to the potential high price in data trade (e.g. 
consumer profiling and targeting data on advertising platforms). Thus, in deciding the data-
sharing policy, platforms assess the expected benefits and costs. 36  
In addition to these broad categorizations, some more granular categories have been suggested. 
A recent study distinguishes between six categories of data generated by online platform users, 
to facilitate an operational analysis of data sharing practices in the platform-to-business user 
relationship:37
 
 Business identification details, i.e. information on the business itself (company’s 
address, VAT number, country of operation).  
 User identification details, i.e. information on customers/potential customers’ identity 
and profile (name, age, gender), contact details (email and delivery/home address), 
geographical provenance (IP address). 
 Data on individual transactions between businesses and customers, i.e. the 
information generated through a specific transaction on the platform (good/service 
provided, price, payment method, communications between the business and the 
customer, reviews and ratings of the transaction, items viewed before/after the 
transaction and provenance on the Internet). 
 Business performance, i.e. information on all transactions taking place through the 
platform (number of product/service offered, prices and price changes, number of 
transactions through the platform, total value of sales, user traffic).  
 User behaviour, i.e. data on customers’/potential customers’ behaviour on the platform 
(such as clicks, browsing history, other products or services purchased on the platform, 
geo-localisation, source of data (provenance), conversion rate).  
 Analyses of market trends/developments, i.e. aggregated data and analysis of data 
collected by the platform and sometimes made (partly) available to business users 
("data-as-a-service").38 
                                                 
 
36 JRC (2020), Digital Economy Working Paper 2020-5, B2B Data sharing: An economic and legal analysis. 
37 VVA (2017) Study on data in platform-to-business relations, p. 27.  
38 From the perspective of the platform business users, the following additional distinction is important: i) Data 
on the business’s own listings, such as sales, customers, transactions and business performance. It is used by 
businesses to manage the accounting, stocks, sales and delivery, forecast future distribution needs and so on; ii) 
Data on the competitor or overall listings, customers, transactions and performance of businesses on the platform 
in a specific market. This kind of data (e.g., search keywords, search volumes, consumer behaviour, etc.) is 
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The above-listed categories of data, whose relevance is confirmed by market research,39 can  
be complemented by another classification criterion based on the source of data. Data on 
individual transactions, business performance and market trends are collected by platforms 
from all business users operating in the platform. Data related to its own business are relevant 
for the business users for planning and managing all business activities. But overall data related 
to business performance, consumer behaviour, or market trends of all the other business users 
of the platforms provide critical additional information and add significant value for business 
decision as they provide an overview of processes, activities, trends, and competition in the 
platform. Such market- or platform-wide data, that can easily include commercially valuable 
information likely to raise trade secrets considerations, are less frequently shared by platforms 
to users and to a very limited extent. 
As these lists indicate, data can be collected at different levels, e.g. for an individual transaction 
of a specific user (individual-level data), for the bundled transactions of a specific user 
(bundled individual-level data) or for a group of individual users (aggregated-level data).40
 
Another way of distinguishing different categories of data could be through a sector-specific 
approach, which takes into account that the value of data for business users very much depends 
on the specific business model and a given industry sector. For example, hospitality platform 
users value highly customer identification data (which is necessary to contact customers for 
promotional activities), whereas user behaviour data (which is necessary to target 
communication to individual customers) is of particular value for app stores and e-commerce 
platform users.41 The value of a sectoral approach has been flagged also by the stakeholder 
feedback received in response to the initial version of the report, of July 2020.
 
In addition, depending on the objective pursued in the analysis, specific classification of 
different types of data need to be developed. For example, in the relationship between data 
and platform market power, specific categories of data may have a different impact on how 
platforms generate and increase their ability to retain users in their ecosystem, to consolidate 
their strategic position in a given market or to expand their activities to adjacent markets. For 
example, the exclusive access to customer identification details may be at the centre of 
platforms’ “intermediation power”42, as they mediate interactions between consumers and 
business users and thus aim to prevent their business users from switching and porting their 
customers’ details to other platforms or from concluding deals directly with their customers, 
outside the platforms’ environment (e.g. in the accommodation sector). In contrast, the ability 
                                                 
 
collected by the platforms, that therefore gain the full overview of the activities taking place on it. For the business 
users, studying competition is one of the key steps to succeed on online platforms. See Gerber, S. (2018), “Want 
to sell on Amazon? 15 strategies for success”, The Next Web (TNV). Available at 
https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/01/19/want-sell-amazon-15-strategies-success/  
39 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and second data sources, Analytical paper 1, p. 18.  
40 Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the digital era, p. 25 et seq  
41 VVA (2017) Study on data in platform-to-business relations, p. 35. 




to analyse market trends on the basis of aggregated transaction data can strengthen the market 
power of vertically integrated platforms, which could use such data for identifying new 
business opportunities43 and foreclosing competitors in these markets.  
Further criteria to be taken into account for classifying data should also include considerations 
of a technical nature – e.g. quality/structure, granularity, volume, frequency, real-time 
availability, format of the data – or the distinction between historic/real-time data, 
public/private data. Incentives to share and capacity to benefit from data vary for business users 
depending on these additional characteristics. Disaggregated and raw data are not highly 
valuable if business users lack capacities to process unprocessed data. Analytics and data-based 
insight require capacities and competence. Therefore, the value for users is higher, but the 
incentives to share by platform are lower, as resources and costs have been invested and 
competitive advantages can be gained from private use.  
Finally, broad considerations about the source of data should also be accounted for44, in 
particular, where companies capitalise on network effects from one service to extend operations 
to more varied services, or when data is acquired from third parties. In particular, in the context 
of online advertising platforms, such complexity of data sources deserves further attention.  
 
3. Data-related practices in the Platform Economy 
 
This report lies on the premise that platforms’ innovative capacities rely, among others, on the 
richness of the data they collect. This is a unique feature of these digital services. For instance, 
e-commerce platforms are able to collect abundant data on their business users as well as on 
customers’ previous purchases, reviews, preferences, and search histories. These data allow 
platforms to continuously adapt and adjust their service45. The 2019 expert group report46 
stressed the online marketplaces’ unique position with regard to data: They “can observe in 
detail how the market functions”; collect and analyse not only customer preferences but also 
the complementarity of products, how prices adjust and other relevant variables to monitor how 
the market is evolving.  
                                                 
 
43 Zhu and Liu (2018), “Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com”, 39 Strategic 
Management Journal 2618 at 2636; see also Belleflamme and Peitz (2019), “Managing Competition in a two-
sided platform”, 28 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 5 at 16. See also the competition investigation 
the European Commission started against Amazon in July 2019: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4291. 
44 Data provenance is an active area of research, which includes efforts for a standardised provenance framework 
45 See Martens, 2016 (p. 5), Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, and 
Thomas Ramge, 2018 (e.g. p. 77) and Zuboff's, Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 2019. 
46 Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the digital era, p. 68.  
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This section intends to give a broad overview of data-related practices in the platforms’ 
environment.  
This mapping and analysis exercise should be read as a non-exhaustive snapshot of the main 
types of behaviors, trying to illustrate a much vast – and fast evolving – collection of practices.  
 
Data acquisition 
In the analysis of the (big) data value chain, data collection is only one step in the process, 
followed by storage, analysis and usage47. This section focuses on data acquisition practices in 
the platform economy, in particular with regards to platforms’ data collection practices as well 
as those of their business users; it does not elaborate on data collection practices by other 
participants in the broader ecosystem. While the extent and methods of data collection differ 
across the various types of online platforms, the below provides a non-exhaustive overview. 
There are several key issues relating to data collection taking into account the various interests 
at stake: (1) the cost of collection/acquisition, (2) incentives for collecting and/or acquiring 
data and competing interests, and (3) the availability and replicability of data. If a certain 
set of data bears great value for several competitors but is not accessible as it is based on data 
generated or accumulated by individual competitors and cannot be effectively replicated, there 
is potentially a stronger need to consider possible policy measures than in cases where data is 
readily available and is not costly to replicate. At the same time, the costs of data collection are 
sometimes high, and collection or production of data require considerable investment.  
While data is inherently non-rivalrous, technical, legal and contractual restrictions may raise 
the costs of data collection for a specific player. Technical barriers can for instance relate to 
data formats, data quality, and the quality of meta-data of data assets, or the distributed or 
encrypted nature of certain data assets – frequently necessary for security or data protection 
considerations. Protection of business secrets, data protection law, as well as privacy of 
electronic communications rules, form a relevant legal restraint for the collection and use of 
personal data. Contractual restrictions may include exclusivity clauses imposed on the transfer 
of data or limitations to the precise purpose of use of data sets48.  
The cost (investment) needed to collect or produce the data is another relevant consideration. 
Here the distinction between volunteered, observed and inferred data, is relevant. Firstly, 
online platforms create the environment and maintain the service that leads to the emergence 
of “digital data traces” from their users, their transactions and their online behaviour. While 
certain data classified as “volunteered” have to be provided as a prerequisite to use the services, 
                                                 
 
47 See for instance: D.L. Rubinfeld & M.S. Gal, “Access barriers to big data”, Arizona Law Review, 2017: 349; E. 
Curry, “The Big Data Value Chain: Definitions, Concepts, and Theoretical Approaches”, in J.M Cavanillas & E. 
Curry, New Horizons for a Data-Driven Economy - A Roadmap for Usage and Exploitation of Big Data in Europe, 
Springer 2018, p. 32. 
48 See also the discussion in M. Bourreau, A. De Streel & I. Graef, Big data and competition policy: Market power, 




platforms must invest in services’ attractiveness, which, inherently, prompts users to provide 
these data by using the service.  
The tendency to collect more data is likely to continue for platforms to increase the quality of 
their services, even though increasingly research is also focusing on extracting actionable 
insights from smaller, more anonymous, and/or distributed data-sets. Whereas the collection of 
volunteered data can be structured from the outset and, therefore, more easily and effectively 
processed, observed data may require a more intensive process as they are more heterogeneous.  
Conversely, inferred data is information that platforms create themselves by analysing 
volunteered and observed data. Therefore, this type of data probably requires the most 
significant investment from platforms. While the detection of regularities and patterns in 
quantitative data may already require considerable investments in expertise and computational 
power, the analysis of textual, audio-visual, or sensor data can have significantly higher 
requirements. 
Secondly, platforms need also to invest to produce predictive data (typically by means of big 
data analytics) as well as to generate other own data. The amount, quality and variety of inferred 
and predictive data, as well as their ability to use the insights for business, process and product 
innovation, generally determine platforms’ relative competitive advantages. Unlike 
volunteered and observed data, inferred and predictive data depends upon platforms’ 
sophistication of analytics, the investment, and the ability to aggregate relevant data. Therefore, 
the size and quality of big datasets, analytical techniques and the financial capacity to exploit 
big datasets become mutually invigorating key assets in the platform economy.  
Business users of online platforms generally – but not always – cannot match the data-driven 
innovation capacity of online platforms. Empirical analysis49 shows a great difference in the 
data savviness of different types of businesses – from large hotel chains, to very small hotel 
owners, from app developers to small shops selling products on market places, or, indeed, from 
large corporations monitoring and optimising their presence on search engines, to minor 
website owners. Business users can typically collect and curate (either independently or, 
sometimes, through interfaces and/or API access offered by online platforms) data resulting 
from their use of the platform, as well as transactional data from their exchanges with 
consumers. Such practices vary from one platform to another. In some cases, the particular use 
of data resulting from the use of the platform is contractually restricted. Some categories of 
business users seek greater access to customer data out of an interest in direct contact of 
consumers, disintermediating the transactions.   








An important consideration stems from the ability to collect data from alternative data 
sources, allowing companies to limit the dependency on online platforms, or indeed triangulate 
data sources and build more valuable insights. This issue deserves further attention for each of 
the specific categories of data considered50 in particular in assessing the dependencies data 
access may create as well as the costs linked to such approaches. Aggregated market insights, 
for instance, might be available elsewhere. Individual customer information details could 
potentially be collected at the point of transaction with individual consumers (whereas the pool 
of personal data of all consumers/users of the platform, could not).  
The limited empirical evidence available shows that four-fifths (81%) of the respondents to a 
platforms’ business users survey indicated that they collect some data themselves. The most 
prevalent data type refers to identification details of own customers (57% of respondents collect 
this data), followed by business performance data (55%) and analysis of market 
trends/developments (55%). Further, a third of the surveyed companies (33%) reported that 
they use third-party sources (data brokers). Most of the interviewees - especially in the e-
commerce sector - reported that they use the services of third-party data and analytics 
providers51. 
                                                 
 
50 See chapter on categories of data, supra. 
51 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and second data sources, Analytical paper 1.   
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Companies specialising in data and insights fill important data gaps, especially with regard to 
data on competition and actionable business insights.52Some data brokers specialise to cover 
specific sectors, such as applications (App Annie, App figures, Apptopia, Mobile Action, 
Sensor Tower), e-commerce (Algopix, Jungle Scout, Sellics, Teikametrics, Terapeak) or 
hospitality (AirDNA, Beyond Pricing, Uplisting, Wheelhouse, Skift). Other data brokers, such 
as Similar Web and Zirra provide data on multiple sectors.  
Data brokers use highly advanced technical methods to extract data, or they buy data from 
online and offline sources. A lot of data is scraped from the platforms.53 While some platforms 
do not permit scraping for commercial purposes that does not always prevent data companies 
from collecting data this way.  
Another key source is crowdsourcing business user account data. Some third-party data 
providers ask business users to share their marketplace information, and then link the data of 
thousands of users to draw market insights.54 When merged with the data gathered by scraping 
the platform’s front-end (e.g., Best Seller rank on Amazon), this can yield quite precise 
estimations and extrapolations.  
The key value proposition of the data brokers lies in their ability to bring together a combination 
of sources as well as superior technical and analytical capacities, innovative tools and 
approaches. Data brokers allow their users to learn about their competitors, get a detailed 
market overview, and obtain actionable insights.55 According to analysts56, this is the kind of 
information that is most in demand by the business users that platforms do not provide to a 
sufficient extent. Further, business users themselves do not need to invest into any analytics or 
IT, but rather buy products tailored to their needs.  
The data companies’ market is very dynamic and fast-paced. A number of issues exist, 
illustrating the key challenges and limitations of data brokers. Firstly, the data companies 
                                                 
 
52 According to PwC estimations, data companies earned $21 billion in 2018. Gröne, F., Péladeau, P., & Samad, 
R. A. (2019). Tomorrow’s data heroes. Strategy+business. Retrieved from https://www.strategy-
business.com/article/Tomorrows-Data-Heroes?gko=5f270  
53 Matsakis, L. (2019). Amazon cracks down on third-party apps over privacy violations. Wired. Retrieved from 
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-marketplace-apps-privacy/ 
54 For example, Jungle Scout collects data from a large number of sellers (over 225,000) who have opted in to 
share their sales information. Rohler, M. (2019). How are Estimated Sales and Revenue Calculated? What are 
AccuSales? Jungle Scout Help Center. Retrieved from https://support.junglescout.com/hc/en-
us/articles/360008616814-How-are-Estimated-Sales-and-Revenue-Calculated-What-are-AccuSales-
#:~:targetText=We%20gather%20it%20from%20a,their%20sales%20info%20with%20us.&targetText=This%2
0means%20that%20as%20we,analyze%20and%20test%20it%20daily. Similarly, if AirDNA users wish to 
receive performance analytics, they will be asked to upload their Airbnb host IDs. After doing this, they can see 
their performance trends, comparative and financial analysis on all vacation rental listings. 
55 In the accommodation/ hospitality sector, companies such as AirDNA provide insights based on data that the 
OTAs do not share. For example, in late 2015 Airbnb stopped providing the overall real-time reservation data. 
AirDNA, in turn, uses an algorithm based on 16 indicators picked up in historical data to determine the reservation 
status for each listing. They argue that their algorithm has an error margin of only 5%. 
56 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and second data sources, Analytical paper 1.  
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remain highly dependent on data sharing policies of platforms.57 Secondly, the data needs of 
platform business users are often very specific and concern platforms that they use. Such data 
cannot be easily scraped or estimated by the third-party data providers58. It includes 
information on real-time of activities on the platform, which would allow to effectively address 
the customer; transaction-related data about the customers, sales activities and listings of 
specific business user. Thirdly, the huge amounts of data that data brokers collect, store, 
possibly re-personalise and disseminate are of interest from the regulatory perspective, first 
and foremost due to privacy concerns. Most individuals or companies are unaware of what 
information data brokers collect on them or even that they collect information at all.59 Due to 
this asymmetry, the data broker industry has been often characterised as opaque, non-
transparent, arbitrary, biased, unfair and unaccountable60.  
As a final point it is also observed that some business users are exploring innovative approaches 
that would allow them to joint forces and be less dependent on big platform companies. One 
example includes cooperative marketplaces, such as Fairmondo.de, which belongs to its 
business users and employees. Through a cooperative structure, the users can share the platform 
as a resource for mutual benefit and decide on the rules for data sharing and access. 
Data sharing 
 
Incentives for data sharing 
The incentives around data sharing are complex and can be related to the business strategies of 
the actors, the objective pursued by, and the potential value. On the one hand, it may be 
assumed that the more costly gaining and preserving these distinctive assets is, the greater the 
incentives for platforms to limit third party access to such data and enhance protection over 
them.  On the other hand, business models that rely on growth through economies of scale, or 
scope, integration, or network effects more general may well choose to share data as part of a 
corporate growth strategy. 
Data sharing practices are at the core of the data(-driven) economy and are a pre-condition for 
generating value across markets through re-use of data. Data sharing practices need to be 
observed in the context of the broader incentives for releasing or protecting data sets.  
Incentives for data sharing range from business strategies for testing innovation opportunities  
around the core business models (e.g. in giving real-time access to data to third party businesses 
                                                 
 
57 For example, Amazon until recently provided exact and broad match search volume and product relevance data 
via one of its APIs. It was feeding several third-party software providers such as Viral Launch and Helium10 until 
late 2018, when the platform removed these metrics from the API. Another platform, Allegro has recently made 
significant investment to develop new data products (Allegro Statistics) that are now provided to its sellers; this 
is endangering the business model of third-party analytics providers. 
58 Graef, I. (2016). EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility. Kluwer 
Law International BV.  
59 Christl, W. (2017). How companies use personal data against people. Working paper by Cracked Labs, Institute 
for Critical Digital Culture. 
60 Christl, W. (2017). How companies use personal data against people. Working paper by Cracked Labs, Institute 
for Critical Digital Culture.  
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which do not compete directly with the platform), or directly monetising data (e.g. in selling 
data sets to businesses or governments for specific applications), to technical considerations 
for interoperability of services, or as part of the value proposition and basic provision of the 
service (e.g. API access to the platform for business users of online marketplaces, aggregated 
reports on market trends and business intelligence shared with hotel owners for better pricing). 
Some companies are also incentivized to share data for reputational and public interest 
considerations (e.g. in sharing data with charities, public bodies or researchers). 
Incentives for protecting data sets from being accessed by other entities are also quite diverse. 
Sometimes they include compliance with regulatory obligations, such as personal data 
protection or cybersecurity constraints, or protecting the service from DOS technical responses, 
or sometimes limiting access caused by crawler bots or to limit the cost of third-party data 
access.  
Other times this relates to business considerations, restricting access to protect trade secrets to 
competitors, or protecting the core of the business model and breaking the network effects the 
value proposition builds on – i.e. avoid disintermediation of transactions between consumers 
and business users. Moreover, data sharing can, in specific cases, facilitate collusion or 
dominants’ ability to leverage market power61.  
Consequently, from a public policy perspective, both the encouragement of data sharing 
practices, and the restriction of data sharing are legitimate objectives under specific 
circumstances.  
When taking decisions to share or not to share data, online platforms must reconcile several 
competing and potentially conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, the success of the business 
users is important because it generates revenues for the platform. In this sense, online platforms 
have a strong incentive to provide access to data that could help businesses to understand their 
customers and to improve their product. On the other hand, online platforms must maintain 
trust of their clients (business users and customers of the business users), which means that 
they should avoid sharing data that these clients are unwilling to share, for example, personal 
information, sensitive business information.  
Online platforms have also designed their terms and conditions to comply with the applicable 
regulatory frameworks, including P2B regulation, personal data protection, competition law, 
regulation forbidding trade in illegal and counterfeit products, and others.  
Several groups of players operate within the data ecosystem surrounding each online platform. 
These include other platforms, large and small businesses, customers of the business users, data 
brokers or companies providing online optimisation tools, regulatory and other public 
authorities. Sometimes these groups have diverging interests and competing demands 
concerning data access. As mentioned earlier, the platforms see personal data protection as part 
of their value proposition, however this claim is not always accepted by some businesses who 
argue that platforms use data protection as an excuse for not sharing important data. If platforms 
                                                 
 
61 J. Crémer, Y.-A. de, Montjoye, H. Schweitzer (2019), Competition Policy for the Digital Era: Final Report, p. 
68, 85, 96. 
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decide to open more raw data to business users, this could benefit large businesses at the 
expense of the smaller ones, because the big companies have the necessary infrastructure and 
know-how to take advantage of such information. 
If a specific dataset is at the core of a platform’s business model, it is unlikely to be shared. 
Due to this reason platforms will be reluctant to share datasets that could be used to undermine 
their role as leading intermediaries in two-sided markets. Vertically integrated platforms are 
not likely to share detailed market-level data, which could help the emergence of new 
competitors in their market. Yet these platforms also make internal decisions on what 
information from their marketplace/app store can or cannot be shared with the retail/app 
development division. Such decisions are of crucial importance to many businesses that 
compete with goods and services sold by the platform itself.  
Finally, the lack of technical interoperability between different platforms is also a constraint 
impeding data sharing and data portability. Introducing interoperability is costly, because it 
requires the development of common standards and revision of back-end code. From the 
perspective of platforms, investing into interoperability does not necessarily provide a clear 
commercial gain. Interoperability also has its downsides because it may make the system 
slower and limit the development of new or innovative products.  
 
Modalities of data sharing 
In this section, various models of data sharing are described. First, in terms of modalities of 
data sharing, a number of useful distinctions could be made, as described below, and illustrated 
with a number of examples. These are not necessarily offered as hard recommendations for 
best practices, but rather meant either to describe established practices, or point to experimental 
efforts challenging the status quo. 
One-off data sharing versus continuous access. Depending on the data user needs, both models 
are legitimate and appropriate in different situations. Continuous, sometimes in real-time, ‘data 
hose’ established through a performance APIs is typically a precondition for uninterrupted 
valuable re-use of data in tech-savvy environments (e.g. building a service ‘on top’ of the data 
access itself, or inspecting and researching socio-technical phaenomena in a data-right 
environment62), but less so in cases the recipient does not have the data analytics skills and the 
infrastructure to make use of the opportunity. One-off data sharing normally includes historical 
data that can be used for market research purposes. 
Where data access is legally mandated, different regimes exist. Opinions are divided over the 
question whether the data portability right enshrined in Article 20 of the General Data 
                                                 
 





Protection Regulation offers a one-off access to data only63 64 or whether it can also be 
interpreted to provide for continuous data access, in particular in sectors where specific data 
access regimes have already been adopted (such as the access-to-account obligation in the 
Payment Services Directive which establishes real-time continuous data access) 65.  
Data sharing for free or against remuneration – there is a range of models under which data is 
shared, intricately related to the incentives for data sharing. Data can be shared for free, as an 
ancillary service or as part of a contractual obligation, or it can make the object of a business 
transaction in itself, for instance under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions 
(FRAND)66.  
 
Example: Twitter API 
The Twitter social network provides access to several types of APIs facilitating access to 
different functionalities of the platform67. For accessing real-time data (tweets and metadata), 
three different plans are available, ranging from free of charge (limited to a small sample of 
tweets), to premium and enterprise versions of the API, against different pricing schemes.  
 
In 2015, Twitter announced that it was ending third-party agreements for the resale of Twitter’s 
so-called “firehose” data, referring to the full stream of tweets available from the service.  
Third-party data analytics services who had built business models on the basis of access to 
Twitter’s firehose were significantly affected by the change, highlighting the complex nature 
of dependencies in the API economy68.  As a particularity, Twitter provides a representative 
sample of tweets in real-time, which allows for statistical processing without full access, 
constituting an interesting model in its own right. 
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Consumer and Market Law 2020 (forthcoming). 
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In the 2017 Communication "Building a European Data Economy", the Commission explored 
the idea of applying a FRAND regime in relation to access to data, whereby access to machine-
generated data would be granted against remuneration69. The Communication notes that a 
framework based on FRAND terms could be developed for data holders to provide access to 
the data they hold against remuneration after anonymisation. Relevant legitimate interests, as 
well as the need to protect trade secrets, would need to be considered. 
The constraints of platform data sharing in some respects are similar to those that FRAND aims 
to solve. First, concentration of data in the hands of several large platforms can potentially lead 
to the abuse of market power. Data can be essential for conducting business in certain markets 
and function as gatekeepers. Any service or product requiring these data is dependent on the 
goodwill of the data holder. Second, opening more data remains a sensitive question for 
platforms. FRAND, in turn, is seen in literature as a measure to increase transparency and trust 
among the participants and therefore incentivise more data openness70.  
Voluntary data sharing vs. compulsory access. While most of the data sharing practices today 
stem from voluntary agreements and market dynamics, some regulatory models also address 
specific issues. Self- and co-regulatory practices apply in a variety of sectors71, and the creation 
of standard contracts by government or setting up other initiatives such as the “data sharing 
coalition” of the Dutch Ministry of Economics72. Mandatory data access conditions are also set 
in a number of legal acts from the transport to the financial services sector. Data access, or 
indeed, conditions for portability and interoperability are also explored in the specifics of 
competition remedies.73 
It could be argued that data held by dominant online platforms is an “essential facility” that 
rivals (other platforms or businesses) need access to in order to compete in the market. It is 
increasingly clear that access to data, and the ability to analyse and glean insights from the 
information, can confer a competitive advantage. However, in the fast-moving digital markets 
it can be difficult to define precisely what is the relevant market, and to then prove that a 
specific platform is dominant in it. Competition authorities would also need to build up a 
portfolio of evidence to show that data held by dominant online platforms is an “essential 
facility” and that platforms denying access to that data are acting in breach of the competition 
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law.74 Mandatory data sharing could impede the development of new business models in such 
a dynamic environment75, and may incentivise platforms to engage in strategic behaviour, for 
instance, by adding noise or large amounts of non-material and raw information of little value 
in the public disclosure.76 All these considerations should be taken into account in assessing 
the implications of a general compulsory access or a specific access mandate.   
Data sharing with direct or indirect competitors is the exception, rather than the rule, notably 
as compliance with competition needs to be ensured when competitors share commercially 
sensitive data. The scenario for data sharing with competitors as a remedy for dominance was 
long discussed in the literature - e.g. around search engine data, with inconclusive results as to 
the effectiveness of the remedy. In many cases, data is publicly available de facto, but 
companies limit its “capture” and use by third parties through the terms and conditions of their 
websites and apps.  
Example: hiQ Labs vs. LinkedIn (US) 
hiQ Labs initiated a lawsuit against LinkedIn when the latter issued a cease and desist order 
against hiQ Labs for scraping data from the publicly available profiles listed by LinkedIn in 
order to further analyse the data and provide its HR intelligence services. The Californian court 
decided77 that the practice of scraping publicly available data did not infringe the American 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA). 
 
Data portability and interoperability discussions are closely related to data sharing objectives 
but follow a slightly different policy concern. Data portability is generally understood as the 
ability to port (transfer) data from one service to another. Interoperability refers to the technical 
features of the data infrastructure and standardisation of data, allowing different technical 
systems to interact. Both measures follow voluntary cooperation schemes as well as, in some 
cases, regulatory provisions, as in the General Data Protection Regulation, the Payment 
Services Directive, or the Digital Content Directive. At the same time, private initiatives for 
facilitating interoperability of services are also emerging, with yet unclear specifications for 
the governance models or the inclusiveness of the services, which could benefit from the 
portability features. Large companies are initiating such efforts amongst themselves, while 
privacy advocates are proposing initiatives structured around “MyData” models78, with an aim 
                                                 
 
74 Graef, I. (2019). Rethinking the essential facilities doctrine for the EU digital economy. RJT ns, 53, 33. 
75 Richter, H., & Slowinski, P. R. (2019), “The data sharing economy: on the emergence of new intermediaries”, 
IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 50(1), 4-29.  
76 Easley, D., Huang, S., Yang, L., & Zhong, Z. (2018). The Economics of Data. Available at SSRN 3252870. 
77  http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/09/09/17-16783.pdf 
78 Antti Poikola, Kai Kuikkaniemi & Harri Honko, MyData (2014), A Nordic Model for human-centered personal 
data management and processing. 
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to empower data subjects to make use of their portability right on personal data79. Nonetheless, 
the success of these models are not undisputed, as it is alleged that the value of data is lower 
than the investment cost; consequently, they may remain marginal and hardly scale.80  
Interoperability and standardization can more generally be seen as key facilitators for the 
sharing of data, and interoperability in particular is a prerequisite for the real-time, continuous 
access to data mentioned above. 
Example: The Data Transfer Project (DTP)81 
The Data Transfer Project is an initiative shared by five major digital services – Google, Apple, 
Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter – aiming at developing an interoperable infrastructure across 
their services, “with open-source code that can connect any two online service providers, 
enabling a seamless, direct, user initiated portability of data between the two platforms”. The 
project is not yet operational, though some documentation is available under an open access 
regime. Use cases announced by the project include facilitating transfer of data to a third-party 
service, switching a service, backing up data. The actual practical use, take-up and implications 
will provide further insights into such industry-led projects on data sharing. 
 
 
Example: Social Web Protocols82 
The Social Web protocols, developed under a W3C working group, proposed a set of protocols 
for social web interactions, including data syntax protocols, client-side APIs and web protocol, 
as well as an underlying linked data platform. This alternative model was concluded in 2018, 
and the community behind it continues experimentation under a Social Web Incubator 
Community Group83.  
 
Data sharing when sensitive data is concerned. One of the outstanding challenges in the data 
(sharing) economy is linked to the potential trade-offs of data protection and security when 
data is released. While some efforts are ongoing to further methodologies of pseudonymization 
of data sets and differential privacy, research also points to risks of re-identification even based 
on features unsuspected to identify a person84. Further discussions emerge, however, on 
                                                 
 
79 See, for example, the P3C Consortium and the Privacy Tech White Book https://www.privacytech.fr/livre-
blanc-privacytech.pdf  
80 Krämer, J., Senellart, P., and de Streel, A. (2020), Making data portability more effective for the digital 
economy: Economic implications and regulatory challenges of the portability of personal data in the digital 
economy. CERRE Policy Report. 
81 https://datatransferproject.dev/  
82 www.w3.org/TR/social-web-protocols/  
83 https://www.w3.org/wiki/SocialCG  
84 E.g. location data, and models can also remember training data, see https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.07886.pdf  
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different models managing access to data, where the actual transfer of data is not necessary in 
itself, whereas the computation and analysis can take place remotely. Some technical and 
governance models are emerging that offer promising avenues for facilitating the value 
extraction from data sets, while mitigating potential risks85.  
Example: The OPAL project (Open Algorithm)86 
The OPAL project is a not-for-profit initiative of the Data-Pop Alliance, Imperial College 
London and MIT Media Lab, Orange and the World Economic Forum, aiming at facilitating 
the use of private sector data for the public good. It is currently focused on telecommunications 
data, with two experiments in Colombia and Senegal, and deeply linked to the use of privately 
held (sensitive) data in support of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The project is 
developed on two dimensions: (1) a technology infrastructure, including open algorithms 
querying pseudonymized data sets stored on the server of the company holding the data and 
sharing aggregate statistics; (2) a governance framework including oversight bodies and 
participatory design and testing of the features. While the project does not, currently, foster 
platforms’ held data, it presents a pioneering model for the technical set-up and the governance 
of data sharing and use.   
 
Data sharing through data markets and other organisational solutions. Data sharing can be a 
by-product of a commercial exchange, but it can also be the main purpose of the interaction. 
Data marketplaces are emerging in a number of fields as resources for identifying and 
potentially commercialising valuable data sets and exchanges. The data ‘offer’ is generally 
brought by so-called data brokers or aggregator services, and different models of data 
marketplaces are emerging.  
Data brokers and online optimisation tool providers play an important role in data markets by 
offering data which is not accessible directly from the platforms. They usually pool platform 
data from multiple sources, including publicly available data, crowdsourced business user 
account data, data provided by platforms through APIs and data scraped from platform 
websites. Platforms argue87 that they do not have direct contractual relationship with the data 
brokers/online optimisation tool providers and thus are not responsible for quality or accuracy 
of the data. Nevertheless, the platforms see value in this market because it is useful for their 
business users. However, they may take action if, for example, they see that traffic from online 
optimisation tools providers start interfering with platforms’ services.  
                                                 
 
85 INSEE offers this service, see www.casd.eu 
86 https://www.opalproject.org/  




A data pool is a centralized repository of data where different organizations can obtain, 
maintain, and exchange information in a standard format. Data trusts also function based on 
similar principles to data pools (see the box below)88. Companies can use data pooling to share 
data “in reference to a given service or generally in an industry, or within an e-ecosystem”89. 
In this situation, companies share a commodity (patented technology or data) to their common 
economic benefit. However, the exclusion of third parties or the unequal treatment of such third 
parties can result in an enhanced market position. Due to this additional market power 
stemming from the shared data, companies may be mandated to share the data with parties 
outside of the pool. However, the data itself in this case should be considered critical for a 
specific purpose90.  
Moreover, in considering the case of mandated data access, the openness of the data pool is 
important. If the data pool is generally open for third parties to join, the rules of the pool should 
provide for equal non-discriminatory treatment of all participants or users. This principle can 
increase transparency and trust among the participants and therefore incentivize market 
participants to engage in sharing. If, in contrast, the pool is closed, it is a priori difficult to 
justify why non-participants should have a right to access the data shared within the pool.91 
Another mode of data sharingis a data sharing platform92, which can take many forms. If the 
data sharing platform merely provides a neutral marketplace for participants to directly 
exchange data in a peer-to-peer model, this scenario appears similar to that of two companies 
sharing or exchanging data directly. In such cases, it seems reasonable to apply the same rules 
as for direct data sharing. An example could be data marketplaces (e.g. Dawex93) that provide 
the technical infrastructure for the exchange of data between multiple parties. From an 
economic perspective, their key function is to facilitate data sharing by lowering transaction 
costs through combining different data sources and matching users and suppliers. If, however, 
the platform provides a gateway to data commonly shared or exchanged between numerous 
companies, it resembles a data pool.  
Example: DAWEX94 
 
DAWEX95 Data Exchange Platform is a global data marketplace that enables actors to share, 
monetize, and acquire data without intermediaries. It is designed for all types of private 
                                                 
 
88 BPE Solicitors, Pinsent Masons, Reed, C., (2019), “Report on Data trusts: legal and governance considerations”. 
Available at https://theodi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/General-legal-report-on-data-trust.pdf  
89 Lundqvist, B. (2018). Competition and data pools. Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 7(4), 146-
154.  
90 BPE Solicitors, Pinsent Masons, Reed, C., (2019), “Report on Data trusts: legal and governance considerations”. 
Available at https://theodi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/General-legal-report-on-data-trust.pdf 
91 Richter, H., Slowinski, P. R. (2019), “The data sharing economy: on the emergence of new intermediaries”, 
IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 50(1), 4-29. 
92 Richter, H., & Slowinski, P. R. (2019), “The data sharing economy: on the emergence of new intermediaries”, 
IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 50(1), 4-29. 
93 https://www.dawex.com/en/  
94 Dawex’ origins are in France. It won the Digital Innovation Competition in 2015 and received funding under 




companies and public-sector organizations, which can coordinate the flow of data by sourcing 
and exchanging data securely and in compliance with applicable regulations, ensuring the 
integrity of license agreements thanks to block-chain technology to manage the security, safety 
and transparency of exchanges.  
 
Platforms’ data sharing with their business users  
Platforms provide data to their business users, which is sufficient to process transactions and 
manage their business. The businesses receive data about their own listings, prices, sales, 
transactions and business performance. Platforms also provide some data about direct 
customers. Further, most major platforms share some data about the broader market, including 
overall market trends, best-selling products, customer profiles, although the type and 
granularity of such information differs from platform to platform. The major platforms compete 
for their business users and thus various metrics and dashboards are part of their value 
proposition. These metrics and dashboards are designed to help the business users to know 
their customers, monitor their own business performance, and understand the broader market 
trends. Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive overview of the key types of data access models. 
A key dimension in discussing the usefulness of data is access to raw vs. processed data. Access 
to raw data is mainly of interest to the bigger business users, who have the infrastructure and 
specialised analytical skills to generate market insights. Yet, the majority of businesses do not 
have the capacity to derive value from unprocessed data. Therefore, as corroborated by the 
Observatory activities96, the majority of business users need processed data or data analytics 
that offer insights on how to better position or market their products and services, appear more 
frequently in search results, and communicate with clients, among others.  In fact, several 
platforms provide data-based guidelines, tips, and advice to business users. Some examples of 
such advice include: optimisation of product titles based on search data; development of a new 
product based on predictions on what consumers will buy; adding tea kettles to hotel rooms to 
attract Asian tourists; change the monetisation model of an app based on user engagement 
trends. This is appreciated by business users. 
Finally, some data may be collected by platforms and provided in both raw and processed form, 
but only as part of other services and for a price. For example, eBay offers the Terapeak 
Research product to its sellers with a Basic, Premium, Anchor or Enterprise Store account; the 
sellers with the Starter account may access data for a yearly or monthly subscription. Other 
platforms such as Amazon, Etsy and others offer advertising services that generate data, which 
is made available specifically to businesses subscribing to such services. 
Several activities of the Observatory have shown that a significant share of business users 
express dissatisfaction with regard to the level of data access provided to them by online 
platforms. A business user survey showed that access to data possessed by online platforms is 
of concern to around a third of surveyed business users who reported that they cannot access 
at least some data that is essential to their business. Generally, although the platforms collect 
and analyse loads of data, only a fraction of this is provided to other players. The platforms do 
                                                 
 
96 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and secondary data sources, Analytical Paper 1.  
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not share the raw big data on day-to-day activities, as well as detailed data on customers and 
competitors. 
This work has identified three groups of concerns that business users express with regard to 
data sharing.  The first is related to lack of access to personal data, such as customers’ e-mail 
address. Some business users, especially in the hospitality and e-commerce sectors consider 
such data of key importance to them so that they could establish a more direct client 
relationship. This data is not provided for a number of reasons: business models, data protection 
or regulatory constraints for advertising. The second corresponds to the claim that business 
users need data that help them to stay competitive, innovate and develop their products and 
services. Partly this is related to data on, for example, search keywords, search volumes, 
consumer behaviour in reaction to different price signals. Platforms do share such data to a 
certain extent (e.g. three most important key words). This is also related to data about 
competitors and their products and services. The third concern is that platforms are taking 
advantage of data to promote their own products that are very similar to those offered by their 
business users. This is primarily pertinent to vertically integrated platforms with significant 
market power. The results of the business user survey indicate that 58% of respondents reported 
that the platform itself offers the same (or very similar) goods or services to those that their 
businesses offer on the platform. The key ways of favouring include ranking, placement of 
advertisement, pricing and other – all of these are enabled by the data collected by platforms.97 
Further understanding is needed, on a cases-specific basis, for clarifying the data access needs, 
the current limitations in accessing data held by platforms – be it for lack of discoverability, 
technical challenges or refusals from platforms to grant access to the data sets - as well as the 
potential trade-offs between the interests of business users, of consumers (and the protection 
of personal data), and those of the online intermediaries. Moreover, with the entry into force 
of the P2B Regulation, and in particular the provisions of Article 9 on access to data, platforms 
will have to provide enhanced transparency on their practices with regards to the data they 
collect, data collected by their business users, as well as sharing practices with third parties. It 
remains to be seen whether these transparency obligations will have a significant impact on 
practices; importantly, monitoring how platforms choose to comply is of paramount 
importance, both for the enforcement of the Regulation and for observing the practices and 




                                                 
 
97 See PPMI (2020), Platform data access and secondary data sources, Analytical Paper 1. For more information, 
consult The Washington Post (2019). Amazon sellers say online retail giant is trying help itself not consumers. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/01/amazon-sellers-say-online-retail-giant-
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products. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/business/amazon-the-
brand-buster.html  Hu, K. (2019). Revealed: how Amazon uses seller data to build a private label juggernaut. 




Table 2. An overview of the key types data access models for P2B data sharing 
 Type of P2B data sharing 
model 
Approach to data sharing Potential key motivations for this 
approach 
Some examples 
i. Open data model.  
Also referred to as “an 
open data approach”98, 
and “open data policy” 99 
An online platform makes data 
accessible to a wide-range of re-
users with (a) “as few restrictions 
as possible”, and (b) “no or very 
limited remuneration”100 (e.g. a 
small payment is required to cover 
re-formatting costs101). 
An online platform (a) may provide 
open data where it has “a strong 
interest” in data re-usage102 – e.g. for 
innovation purposes103. Such a strong 
interest in re-usage may be rooted in 
"data philanthropy", "corporate 
social responsibility" and “strategic 
interests”104. An online platform (b) 
can be legally required to make 
certain data openly accessible105. 
E.g. Google Trends 106, Google 
Books Ngram Viewer, Google 
Finance, Amazon Web 
Services Open Data, Million 
Song Dataset.107 
                                                 
 
98  European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space p. 5 
99 E. Scaria, A. Berghmans, M. Pont, C. Arnaut and S. Leconte, "Study on data sharing between companies in Europe", p. 64. For further background information 
on open data, the Open Data Institute (ODI) examines how three big business create value with open data. 
100 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space p. 5 
101 E. Scaria et al., p. 64 
102 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space p. 5 
103 E. Scaria et al., p. 64 
104 European Commission (2017), p. 14 
105 E. Scaria et al., p. 64 
106 European Commission (2017) 
107 For further examples of open datasets see B. Marr (2016) 
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ii. Data monetisation 
model108. 
 
An online platform makes data 
accessible via a “unilateral 
approach” – e.g. through a 
particular licence109 . 
An online platform wants to (a) 
generate “revenue” through data 
sharing and, in some cases, add 
further value via (b) “the provision 
of services”110. 
E.g. “Telefónica […] provides 
access to anonymised or 
aggregated insights derived 
from the data that the company 
holds […]”111. 
iii. Data marketplace model.112 
Also referred to as “data 
monetisation on a data 
marketplace”113 – this 
could be considered as a 
sub-category of data 
monetisation. Furthermore, 
open data marketplaces 
(e.g. G. Smith e.a. (2016), 
Deloitte (2012)) could be 
considered as a sub-
An online platform uses a trusted 
third party intermediary – i.e. a 
data marketplace – for data 
transactions114. E.g. data access 
may be provided through bilateral 
contracts115. 
An online platform (a) is unsure 
about the “potential re-users for 
their data” – and is able to test the 
market through “one-off data 
monetisation efforts”116. The 
company wants to (b) generate 
“revenue” through data sharing117. 
E.g. Dawex, Data Intelligence 
Hub.  
 
                                                 
 
108 E. Scaria et al., p. 61 
109 E. Scaria et al., p. 61 
110 E. Scaria et al., p. 61 
111 E. Scaria et al., p. 61 
112 E. Scaria et al., p. 62. For further background information on data marketplaces see Florian Stahl et al.  
113 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
114 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5; E. Scaria et al., p. 62 
115 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
116 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
117 E. Scaria et al., p. 62 
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category of open data 
models. 
iv. Exclusive data platforms. 
Also referred to as “data 
exchange in a closed 
platform”118, “industrial 
data platforms”119, “direct 
data exchange between two 
companies” 120 and “data 
pooling”121. 
An online platform shares data via 
a closed platform (e.g. 
independently, via a third party 
intermediary)122. For instance, a 
restricted group of users may 
voluntarily join an industrial data 
platform123. 
An online platform may want to: (a) 
obtain “monetary remuneration”; (b) 
offer “value-added services”; (c) 
create more “stable data 
partnerships”; and/or (d) retain 
greater “control” over the re-usage of 
data124. 
E.g. Industrial data platforms: 
“Airbus and MAN created 
Skywise and RIO platform 
(respectively)”125. 
                                                 
 
118 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
119 E. Scaria et al., p. 62 
120 H. Richter and P. R. Slowinski (2019) 
121 H. Richter and P. R. Slowinski (2019) 
122 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
123 E. Scaria et al., p. 62 
124 European Commission (2018): Towards a common European Data Space, p. 5 
125 E. Scaria et al., p. 62 
 
33 
v. Technical enablers126. 
 
A technical enabler is a third party 
company that facilitates B2B data 
sharing between other companies 
through a “technical solution”127. 
Technical enablers are not data 
marketplaces or exclusive data 
platforms; revenue is generated 
through the “set-up, 
implementation and maintenance 
of their solutions”128. 
An online platform may work with a 
technical enabler in order to (a) 
“exchange data within a particular 
community in a more agile way”; 
and (b) utilise and customise existing 
tools for P2B data sharing rather than 
“investing resources in developing 
something new”129.   
E.g. “API-AGRO, DKE-Data, 
Nallian and Sensative”130. 
 
  
                                                 
 
126 E. Scaria et al., p. 63 
127 E. Scaria et al., p. 63 
128 E. Scaria et al., p. 63 
129 E. Scaria et al., p. 63 
130 E. Scaria et al., p. 63 
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4. Main policy issues 
 
A number of policy questions have emerged without necessarily generating wide-ranging 
consensus on the answers. This is linked to the diversity of the role and nature of data in the online 
platform environment, in comparison with other sectors where data sharing has already been 
mandated or is being discussed (e.g. PSD2131, agriculture132, automotive, energy133). In addition, 
factors such as the types of data at stake, the diversity of services offered in the platform economy 
as well as the different business models that exist, also play a role. To exemplify this diversity, in 
what follows the report maps a number of policy challenges and provides an analytical summary 
of the status quo and known practices in the platform economy. It builds necessarily on preliminary 
work134. It will conclude with further questions and recommendations for collection of additional 
evidence necessary to formulate policy advice recognizing the heterogeneity of data issues in the 
online platform economy135.  
 
Value of data: a premise 
 
Consumers often ignore or underrate the value of the data they generate through their use of online 
platforms and their online interactions with businesses – often as a by-product of their online 
activities. At the same time, the large online platforms have become very skilled at designing 
strategies to collect data and at understanding, evaluating and commercialising such information. 
Data driven network effects ensure that the better they perform, the more they can attract new 
business users and, again, more information through growing consumer interest. This causes a 
virtuous circle for those platforms that are already in or even leading the game, while it becomes 
much more difficult for new companies to enter and to catch up. To the extent that access to large 
data sets has become a requirement for data-driven innovation with the production and curation of 
                                                 
 
131 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35 
132 https://www.copa-cogeca.eu/img/user/files/EU%20CODE/EU_Code_2018_web_version.pdf  
133 cf. Article 23 on principles for the use of smart metering data generated by consumers of Directive (EU) 2019/944 
on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU; OJ L 158 p. 125; 
14.6.2019 
134 Such as the report on “Competition policy for the digital era” and a literature review and formerly collected 
evidence sources. 
135 Other policy issues not addressed in this report relate to: i) Data governance for citizens; ii) Data sharing with 
competent public authorities or relevant third parties; and iii) Data for good initiatives. 
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data sets being a costly investment, dominant platforms are likely to benefit from their position 
over competitors and new market entries (Furman et al 2019: 4). Given the high level of 
concentration of digital platforms, the dynamics of data markets may reinforce the tendency 
towards monopolies in the data economy.136  
The value of data for individual businesses is however difficult to assess and depends in particular 
on a business’ ability to analyse and use data. Unlike tangible assets, data is non-rival, therefore 
data sharing does not reduce one’s ability to use it or diminish its value, but sharing it may reduce 
a competitive advantage. Therefore, it is difficult to measure (and monetise) the value of data 
which might differ from one user to another or depend on the context and purpose data is intended 
for.  
As mentioned earlier, we can distinguish between volunteered, observed or inferred data. One 
measure to determine the value of data could therefore be the cost of its production, which is 
naturally higher, where companies need to invest considerably to aggregate, process and analyse 
data to produce inferred data. The value of data can also be established by the existence of and 
competition with rival data sources and the willingness of businesses to pay a certain price to 
purchase it. Finally, the impact that certain data sets or, correspondingly, the lack of availability 
of good quality data can have on the economy and society can determine the value of data. 
With the expected future growth of data on the one hand and its increasing economic and social 
value on the other, the question of appropriate governance structures arises. Future governance 
arrangements of the data economy will need to clarify rules and rights regarding control over, 
access to and use of data.  
 
Data as a source of market power  
 
The competitive relevance of data for all actors in the online platform economy, and hence the role 
of data as a foundation of market power, has been increasingly a topic of analysis for competition 
                                                 
 
136 The European Data Market Study of 2017 has been measuring the size and trends of the EU data economy. 
According to its findings, the overall value of the data economy was almost reaching € 300 billion in 2016. According 
to the estimates of the data market monitoring tool, the value of the data economy in 2016 was worth nearly 2% of the 
European GDP. By 2020, the EU data economy is expected to increase to € 739 billion with an overall impact of 4% 
on the EU DGP under a High Growth Scenario characterized by a stronger driving role for digital innovation and 
higher ICT investments. Other studies do also estimate the consumer surplus value of these data-based services. Collis, 
Moehring and Sen (2020), ‘Economic Value of Data: Quantification Using Online Experiments’, NetInstitute 
Working Paper.  
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experts and not only. For instance, the expert group report on "Competition policy for the digital 
era"137 recently pointed out that "the competitiveness of firms will increasingly depend on timely 
access to relevant data and the ability to use that data to develop new, innovative applications and 
products". Data reinforces each characteristic of platforms and thereby strengthens the tendency 
of market tipping and exposes the existence of economic power of platforms. 
For example, Ant Financial, a spinoff from Alibaba, represents one of the most spectacular data-
driven developments of a platform ecosystem. Based on Alipay, the payment system of Alibaba, 
Ant Financial, has now nearly reached the double of the market capitalization of Goldman Sachs. 
Its strength lies in applying AI analytics to the enormous amount of data generated by the 
widespread use of mobile payments both for on-line and off-line transactions in China138. 
Both, network effects and economies of scope in data generate a number of important challenges. 
First, an incumbent platform with a large market share naturally obtains a large amount of data 
from its users. The larger the amount of data, the higher the improvement in quality the platform 
can make, which in turn induces the platform to get an even larger market share, reinforcing the 
tendency for market tipping, which could risk leading to a monopoly. Second, data affects both 
entrants’ ability to expand or enter and incumbents’ ability to defend and protect themselves. 
Without access to a significant amount of data, entrants may face difficulties to provide themselves 
a service of sufficiently good quality from entry to compete with an incumbent platform. In 
addition, incumbent platforms can use big data analytics to identify and neutralize potential threats 
of entry by taking defensive/offensive measures such as pre-emptive mergers and acquisitions, 
even if this does not always prevent the emergence of new platforms.139 Finally, a platform with a 
large ecosystem, i.e. which operates in multiple markets or sectors, can leverage its data advantage 
to enter an adjacent market served by specialized platforms140. When a new technology opens a 
new market, platforms with a large ecosystem may be the first to enter the market by leveraging 
their ecosystem and data power. For instance, Google, Apple and Amazon launched (or are 
                                                 
 
137 Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the digital era 
138 Zhu et al. (2017) 
139 See the description of how Facebook used a data-app, Onavo, to spot potential threats and buy or copy them in 
p.306 of Stucke, Maurice E., 2018. “Should we be concerned about data-opolies?” 2 Georgetown Law Technology 
Review 275 
https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2.2-Stucke-pp-275-324.pdf  
On the role of data analytics in acquisitions see Lear (2019), Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in 
Digital Markets.  
https://www.learlab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CMA_past_digital_mergers_GOV.UK_version-1.pdf, p. 13, 
point I.56; on acquisitions strategies see J. Furman, D. Coyle , A. Fletcher, D. McAuley, P. Marsden: Unlocking 
digital competition. Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, London 2019, UK Government (Furman 2019), 
p.40; on pre-emptive acquisitions see Bourreau/Streel, Digital Conglomerates and EU Competition Policy, 2019, p. 
21;  further examples of usage of data for the purpose of acquisitions are reported  in Khan, “The Amazon’s 
Antitrust Paradox”, The Yale Law Journal 2017, 710 (755, 780f.), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/e.710.Khan.805_zuvfyyeh.pdf; regarding acquisitions by Facebook see 
Giulio/Scott Morton/Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption, 2019: 21, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393911. 
140 Stigler Center Report (2019) 
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expected to launch) their own cloud game platform to challenge the incumbents Microsoft and 
Sony.  
In summary, data can reinforce tipping, create entry barriers and increase the economic power of 
platform ecosystems that benefit from strong network effects and economies of scope and scale in 
data. Dominant platforms and powerful platform ecosystems that, thanks to their data related 
advantages, face no threat of entry from competitors, would have little incentive to innovate to 
increase consumer welfare. Hence, there is a risk that the potential benefit from data-driven 
innovations would remain under-exploited. 
The economic power of large online platforms is therefore a key challenge for the economy as a 
whole. It becomes even more critical in view of the gateway position platforms hold for a number 
of SMEs who need them to reach their consumers. It is therefore necessary, on the one hand, to 
look at competition on the market intermediated by platforms and the practices platforms apply to 
data sharing as well as on the other hand to look at competition between different platforms for a 
market in a specific sector and what role data sharing plays in this area. Another element related 
to competition and the possibility for businesses to multi-home or to switch service providers is 
linked to business' ability to benefit from data portability and interoperability. Therefore, it will be 
important to assess the effect that restrictions to portability and interoperability will have on 
innovation and consumer benefit and whether there are any “negative network effects” impacting 
at least some players in the online platform economy, and notably consumers.  
The power and attraction of a broader market for consumer data relevant for the entire economy, 
which is not limited to the classic advertisement industry, would also need to be considered. 
Platforms capture rich information about consumer preferences and behaviour that could sooner 
or later be useful for almost any consumer facing business. It could therefore be useful to analyse 
the specific status a few Big Tech companies have gained in capturing these data points and the 
structuring effect this has had on the entire consumer-facing economy, not just in their own and 
neighbouring markets but also in markets these companies may never want to enter. The huge and 
valuable data assets they have created cannot easily be replicated by other, notably emerging 
companies.  
 
Data sharing  
Online platforms aggregate large amounts of data, which is at the very core of their business 
models141. Platforms’ ability to build and maintain a user base on both sides of the platform 
depends largely on the collection and retention of data. Most of these data collected by platforms 
                                                 
 
141 See e.g. Shoshana Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism, Profile Books; Main edition (31 Jan. 2019).   
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is valuable for their business users as well as for third party businesses. It can help them to increase 
matching efficiencies, lower search costs, and contribute to innovation. However, instances have 
occurred where platforms refused to share data with their business users, even though in many 
cases the data is stemming from their business users or customers or was generated through their 
transactions and is then transformed into secondary data by the platform142.  
In the platform to business relationship, two main issues have emerged. First, although user-
specific data are extensively shared by the platform with the business users, they lack access to 
more individualised data about their own operations or own customers/consumers or to a sufficient 
level of insight. Second, they require aggregated data on the entire market including also on 
competing business users' operations and their respective customers/consumers. For example, 33% 
of the ‘heavy’ users of online platforms responding to a survey143 stated that they had experienced 
data access related issues in their trading practices with online platforms. A business user survey, 
carried out in 2019144 showed that around 27% of surveyed enterprises disagreed, strongly 
disagreed or partly disagreed with the statement that the platforms share these platform-wide data 
with the business145 users to a very limited extent. 
Closely linked to the previous point on platforms' sharing of data with their own business users is 
the issue of data sharing with third party companies (e.g. other platforms, third party business users 
and data companies or data brokers who then trade data or data analytics), who could also make 
use of such data and potentially provide societal benefits by doing so.  
Fully digital value chains (e.g. those integrating cloud and IoT services, or so-called “microservice 
architectures”) tend to be characterised by a greater amount of data sharing between parties. At the 
same time, data sharing between more traditional non-digital businesses and digital platforms is 
still an emerging area, even though the trend is clearly for all companies to increasingly realize the 
potential of data. An EC Study on B2B data sharing of 2018 found that a considerable proportion 
of companies which are not yet engaged in B2B data sharing and re-use, expect to start sharing 
and re-using data in the next five years. The EC study distinguishes notably between data suppliers 
and data users. “Data suppliers make datasets available to interested data users in compliance with 
relevant laws. This means that they hold ‘ownership’-type of rights over data and/or have obtained 
legal permission from private individuals to share their data. Data users access data from data 
suppliers following the conditions set up and agreed on between them. Companies may play a dual 
                                                 
 
142 See the Amazon competition investigation of July 2019: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4291.  
143 Ecorys, Business-to-business trading practices in the online platform environment (2017), study commissioned by 
the European Commission, available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/04c75b09-
4b2b-11e7-aea8-01aa75ed71a1/language-en  
144 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and secondary data sources, Analytical Paper 1, Chapter 4.  
145 PPMI (2020), Platform data access and secondary data sources, Analytical Paper 1.  
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role in this ecosystem, i.e. they are both data suppliers and data users. In certain cases, companies 
decide to engage in strategic partnerships to exchange data among them. Industrial data platforms 
formalise and operationalise these alliances, which can encompass different business sectors, or 
be limited to a specific industry.” 
The rise of B2B exchange platforms has led to business data accumulation by third parties, who 
use these data for analytics and value creation in a growing secondary data market. This also 
impulses the trend to “platformisation” in traditional industries like automotive or energy. 
Third party data sharing could enable the provision of input for ‘data pools’ established for a 
specific purpose (e.g. for AI training or charity or fundraising practices)146 but also enable service 
providers to enter new markets. Reticence of platforms to share data, which could be relevant for 
business users to improve their own performance, e.g. on B2B IoT platforms, has led to a lack of 
trust in among the businesses using and depending on online platforms, which it is crucial to re-
establish. But, at the same time, more data sharing could also result in sharing commercially 
sensitive data with competitors, which platform users would be also reluctant to do.   
 
Data governance 
The data economy is still evolving as is our understanding of an appropriate legislative and 
regulatory regime for future transactions and usages of data. At present, control over data in the 
data economy is largely dominated by de facto technical control and contractual rights147. In the 
absence of any specific legal provisions, this leads to a de facto ownership, meaning that businesses 
or organizations in the position to collect data are able to exercise more or less exclusive control 
over it (albeit within the legal frameworks set by the GDPR and other relevant legislation).  
While some platforms make data available to consumers, third-parties, or business users through 
APIs or data sharing portals, platforms can base their refusals for further sharing on data protection 
or trade secrets considerations. Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services (the so called “P2B 
Regulation”)148 was conceived as a first step to ensure a more transparent and predictable trading 
environment for online business users. While it does not oblige platforms to share data with their 
business users it requires them, however, to be transparent about their data sharing practices with 
business users and third parties. As long as platforms provide such transparency, they may grant 
preferential data access to either their own businesses or businesses they control or to some of their 
business users and not to others. The platform still maintains a privileged market overview because 
                                                 
 
146 This could take the form of a ‘data cooperative’ or ‘data trust’; models are only emerging.  
147 Duch-Brown, Martens and Mueller-Langer (2017). 
148 OJ L186, p. 57, 11.7.2019. 
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it has access to data of all its business users resulting in information asymmetry to its own 
advantage (self-preferencing).149   
Research on the need for regulation of the data economy, including viable approaches and their 
potential effects, is evolving at a high pace. While, in 2017, Kerber150 still argued that it was not 
even clear whether the lack of access to and trade in data constituted a problem in need of public 
intervention or whether contractual arrangements among market players would be sufficient151, 
research has evolved since, notably as regards IoT ecosystems152. Also, different EU and 
international reports have advocated for effective ex-ante regulatory measures153.  
Part of the challenge that research on data governance models is facing can be explained by the 
non-rival nature of data. It is worth noting that the reduced cost of making data available implies 
greater economic and political latitude with regard to resource allocation. As the OECD points 
out154: "Non-rivalrous goods come with an additional degree of freedom with respect to resource 
management". However, notwithstanding its non-rivalry, third party use of data sets can be 
excluded. Data sets do not travel as easily as cultural goods such as video or audio files, as data 
structures and formats are generally not standardized across application sites.  
To an increasing degree, data are today automatically generated by machines or programmes, not 
by human beings.155 Even when data sets represent human beings or social actions, people may 
only be passively involved in data generation as a source rather than a producer,156 and data 
production often involves more than one entity. All these aspects make an allocation of rights to 
access, use and transfer between producers and users a very complex task.157  
                                                 
 
149 Not using this valuable information could however result in welfare losses on the consumer side of the platform.  
Competition policy, and the use of data sharing as a means to overcome monopolistic behaviour, need to walk a fine 
line between avoiding the welfare losses from monopolistic behaviour and avoiding losses from not using the 
informational advantage.  Whether data sharing among all parties is a solution is still very much debated.  A recent 
economics paper discusses this dilemma - Kirpalani, Rishabh and Philippon, Thomas, Data Sharing and Market Power 
with Two-Sided Platforms (October 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w28023.  
150 Kerber (2017:16) 
151 "a comprehensive analysis of market failure problems is still missing", Kerber (2017:11) 
152 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3445422  
153 Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019), Competition policy for the digital era, the UK Furman Report, the Stigler 
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Building upon the learnings of data sharing initiatives in different jurisdictions,158 including 
initiatives funded by the European Commission such as the first EU-wide accelerator, Data 
Pitch159, an interdisciplinary debate around data governance is exploring various regulatory 
approaches for encouraging forms of sharing and granting access to data160. Zech161 is one of the 
few scholars who investigates the possibilities of introducing a producer right to data. Legal 
ownership allocated to the "economically responsible operator of equipment that generates the 
data"162, he argues, would create incentives not only to produce but also to make available or reveal 
data163. As a result, new markets for reuse of data could evolve, which otherwise might not emerge 
at all. Moreover, rights to data property would increase transparency on available data, reduce 
uncertainty about data ownership and thereby potentially strengthen the efficiency of data 
markets164.  
The discussion about other regulatory options is in full swing. In its data strategy of February 
2020165, the European Commission emphasizes that, by 2030, the EU aims to “create a single 
European data space – a genuine single market for data, open to data from across the world – where 
personal as well as non-personal data, including sensitive business data, are secure and businesses 
also have easy access to an almost infinite amount of high-quality industrial data, boosting growth 
and creating value...”, but also acknowledges that “[c]urrently there is not enough data available 
for innovative re-use, including for the development of artificial intelligence.” The central 
underlying question is how data access and sharing can be encouraged even if “data access and 
sharing may benefit others more than it may benefit the data holder and controller, who may not 
be able to privatise all the benefits of data re-use. (…) The argument that follows is that if data are 
shared, free-riding users can ‘consume the resources without paying an adequate contribution to 
investors, who in turn are unable to recoup their investments”166. Caution is also stressed against 
                                                 
 
158 See e.g. GovLab. Data Collaboratives. Retrieved from:http://datacollaboratives.org/; Hub of All Things 
(HAT):https://www.hubofallthings.com/, Nesta  
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exclusively designing data sharing as a tool to hinder the consolidation of mature platforms and 
foster a rapid growth of new entrants. 
Other barriers for sharing data consist in the perceived risk of violating data protection and/or 
intellectual property provisions but also the fear of losing control over the reuse of data and 
cybersecurity constraints. Given the specific properties of data, it can be difficult for data producers 




Over the last two decades, the digital transformation has brought about an enormous growth of 
data, notably on on-line platforms, new means of analysing big data sets and new opportunities for 
realising commercial and public value. Data enable data-based innovations across the public and 
private sectors, allowing new business models and markets to emerge, which are specifically 
designed for generating, collecting and commodifying data. Digital platforms, which collect data 
about their users and the interactions with and among them, are examples for this development. 
Some of the prominent platforms play a pioneering role in the development of data-driven 
technologies and applications. This also includes the use of machine learning processes in the 
analysis of data and the creation of AI-based services167.  
While the European data economy is still evolving, companies already collect, share and re-use 
data among them to innovate, develop new products and services and/or new business models. 
They have recognised the potential and benefits of these activities and the new opportunities to 
help improve their services and their relationship with their customers, and to leverage data-driven 
network effects for generating additional revenues.  
Research has shown that the proportion of data shared by companies usually depends on their 
business strategy. There are a number of different actors in the online ecosystem, which is cross-
border and inter-sectorial by nature. These different actors have different interests in relation to 
data.  
As a result, data may be shared against payment, or companies may preserve a certain discretionary 
autonomy with whom they want to share what data and under which conditions. Especially for 
smaller companies which do not naturally gain access to a critical mass of data in their activity, 
not having access to relevant data can have negative consequences such as missed business 
opportunities to improve relations with their customers, but also to innovate, scale up or streamline 
administrative processes.  
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In addition to the opportunities that data sharing between online platforms and their business users 
undoubtedly offers, there are also responsibilities, such as GDPR compliance, and other legal, 
technical and financial burdens on both platforms and their business users. Moreover, questions of 
proportionality, purpose limitation and non-discrimination arise as well as those of the rights of 
the data subjects.  
This report highlights the diversity of what is commonly subsumed under the heading “data”. This 
is indeed not a homogenous, clearly delineated concept, and the design of any public policy with 
particular focus on online platforms should reflect this. This means in particular that an all-
embracing, horizontal policy approach, disregarding the heterogeneity of data in the platform 
economy and the variety of business-specific practices, would not be appropriate 
More research is needed to better understand the main long-term incentives as well as the potential 
and limits of voluntary and mandatory tools for platforms to collect, analyse and share data.  
Further research is also needed to assess the viability of different, potentially competing models, 
which may be based on free access to and use of data for (certain) third parties, (limited) data-
sharing or data ownership. Additional work also needs to be devoted to the assessment of the 
overall effect of potential data sharing obligations, and on weighing the risks of the latter against 
potential benefits for competition, value creation and innovation.  
In this context, it is important to take into account privacy and data protection rules and also 
incentives for platforms to establish and scale up. This is all the more relevant for newly emerging 
platforms, whose main assets may be the data they collect. For instance, horizontal data sharing 
obligations could put at risk those new players’ existence.  
The work for policy makers will therefore come down to answering specific questions, such as 
what kind of data should the regulator focus on when requiring platforms to share more data. 
Despite the incontestable appeal that simple rules across the board may have, when it comes to the 
data economy, such an approach will not work, and may risk doing more harm than good. 
To achieve the goal of maximizing the benefits of data for all actors, and not only for a select few, 
regulators will have to delve into the details of  what could appropriate thresholds be under which 
a platform is obliged to share data and how should that data be made available. To make things 
more complicated, the solution to such challenges might also differ depending on sectors or 
ecosystems where it would apply. 
To support this challenging policy work ahead, we would recommend that the Observatory, in the 
next phase of its work on data (beyond the mandate of the expert group who has authored this 
report), focuses on some specific areas: 
1. Continuous gathering of empirical evidence, to further deepen the understanding of data-
driven ecosystems - e.g. on data sharing practices in a range of intermediaries, varying 
needs depending on the users and their specific purposes or issues relating to the 
indispensability and replicability of data in the platform economy. 
2. Further research on technical modalities for data collection and sharing (e.g. overview of 
the ecosystem of APIs and related emerging technology interfaces for data-sharing), so that 
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any future obligations or prohibitions on companies as regards data can take due account 
of technical possibilities and constraints. 
3. Case studies to analyze the impact (in a sectoral approach if needed) of possible solutions 
covering incentives as well as constraints for data sharing (e.g. discriminatory access to 
data, exclusivity arrangements, examination of opportunities, risks and benefits of a 
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